Philosophy 101 Unit 1

So I missed the Gehlen lecture(s). I have a ton of questions. Instead of meeting up with Daniel and talking to him individually, I figured I’d give y’all a chance to prove your stuff.

All of my questions will be directly from the text, as in I’ll be quoting each segment that confuses me (just a heads up). This is going to be rather nitpicky…but bear with me. I may bring up lines that don’t matter that much, but I just want to be sure.

Page 88

At the bottom of this page is a little portion to explain further the notion of us being “constitutionally embryonic through and through” based on a previous work by Gehlen. In the blurb at the bottom it states, “on evidence from comparative embryology…the human gestation period is too short (by several months) to bring the human fetus to the same level of maturity at birth as for the fetus of closely related species.” What is he trying to say here? Is this arguing that in order to correct our frailness/vulnerability upon birth, a few more months in the womb would be a solution? What other species is he talking about? This is the first time I’ve really noticed or translated what a philosopher said as suggesting that we are inferior to other animals from a biological perspective. It’s possible that he’s not even referring to our vulnerability though he does say we are “Poorly equipped as he is with sensory apparatus, naturally defenseless, naked….possessing only inadequate instincts, man is a being whose existence necessarily depends upon action.” I’m not really sure how these two concepts are connected (at least in how I’m translating the text).

Page 89

“It {I believe this pronoun refers to technique} truly mirrors man–like man himself it is clever, it represents something intrinsically improbable, it bears a complex, twisted relationship to nature.” I don’t really understand what is meant by a twisted relationship to nature. Is this what Dan kept talking about in terms of the mirror concept?

Page 91

“The tendency, which characterizes the progress of technique…is ultimately rooted in a mysterious law pertaining to the realm of the mind….Nonorganic nature is more knowable than organic nature.” Why is this? Is this because we “created” or rather “manipulated the creation of” inorganic substances? We still don’t know the consequences of the inorganic, and I thought that was one thing Gehlen was harping at earlier in the article.

Page 92

I don’t get the quote by Bergson. I understand the first part, but not the actual quoted material. As in I get this segment: “intellect can only be judged in relation to action, and its primary aim is the production of artifacts”

This is what I don’t get: “‘Therefore…we may expect to find that whatever is fluid in the real will escape (the intellect) in part. Our intelligence, as it leaves the hands of nature, has for its chief object the unorganized solid.’”

Page 94

What is meant by saying that “the natural sciences attained the modern configuration, that is, they become analytical-experimental” ? I think I’m missing this point because my knowledge of history is somewhat lacking. Is it just that now beliefs were open to be tested in scientific manners and questioned in the same sense rather than relying on religion, or rather, Gehlen’s notion of magic, to explain everything?

At the bottom, there is mention of the third factor that allowed for astonishing accomplishments of the modern era. What were the first two? I seem to have missed them in my hyper attention to the article. (I guess you could call that inattention) :OP

Page 95

Can someone elaborate on this point and explain how/what is meant by it?

“The notion that technique constitutes ‘applied science’ is obsolete and old-fashioned: today the three establishments–industry, technique, and natural science–presuppose one another.” How do they presuppose one another? Is this just a quick way to say that they completely overlap and rely on another?

Page 96

What is meant by “the capitalist mode of production” ? Is this suggesting that progress only occurs when it is financed? Is this a criticism?

Just two lines down, Gehlen makes a claim that seems very blanketed statement. I’m not sure where the foundation for this claim is, though I might just be missing the point entirely or doubting what I think it means.

“One cannot expect such historically unique and radical processes to remain without influence upon the consciousness of the men involved in them.”

Is this in relation to the claims made by either Clark or Dreyfus about the replacement that occurs because of technology with human relations to one another? As in, the whole notion that your in multiple places at once because of technology?

Page 97

What is meant by “technique proper” in this section?

“It is easy to see that this definition {an attempt to bring about changes to the advantage of men, by diverting things from their own path and toward our own service} can encompass both magic and technique proper, thus both supernatural and natural magic.”

Page 98

“This primary human interest in the regularity of the processes of nature deserves emphasis: It betrays a semi-instinctual need for stability in the environment” I feel like the word “betrays” is the opposite from what is meant in this article. If anything, what we are missing is that the only stability we can count on in life but especially in nature is instability.

As you all know, I get rather annoyed when philosophers speak of G-d or some type of G-d like figure. I feel that is the impact of their society (or their time) affecting their brilliant work. I may be mistaken about this next portion, but it seems like he’s referring to G-d getting involved or that humans have G-dlike abilities. If it is the latter, then he’s betraying his argument about magic unless I’m completely misunderstanding his point.

“Also, the magical forces with which the world is filled are neither arbitrary nor spontaneous;one can set them into motion by means of the appropriate, precisely repeated formulas, after which they operate under their own impulse, necessarily and automatically.”

Isn’t this what people believed once upon a time, or I guess you can argue that religious fanatics still believe in this? Hence the rain dances and other acts? Who is this one he speaks of? Anyone? That defies his argument per my understanding.

Page 99

What is meant by this phrase?

“The fascination with automatisms is a prerational, transpractical impulse, which previously, for millennia, found expression in magic..” Is this suggesting that before we were able to rationally explain certain things, we found answers in magic?

Can someone explain the “dumb process of nature?”

I’ll stop there, perhaps some answers to these questions will help me understand the rest that I’m questioning

Thanks All!

Here is a picture of a human robot that was created several years ago. I encourage you to look at the picture. When I first saw it, the picture was in a newspaper of the two in a subway. I could not differentiate the two.

http://www.crunchgear.com/2007/04/27/when-robots-attack-what-does-the-future-hold/

Here is a video showing the movements and abilities the creators were able to manipulate mechanically on this robot to make him appear more human:

and if that doesn’t work, here’s the link: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RksP_gAqSh0

Now in terms of believing what something is based on “what it seems,” which I believe is a Descartes-ism, here is a video from youtube that a human appears to be a robot based on how he moves and the sounds emitted. Ignore the first thirty seconds.

And here’s the website in case that doesn’t work:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SR4eBe5FNwU

To know the difference between human or robot, must we see the “object” being viewed lagging? Or rather, must it be imperfect about it’s movement in order to determine how “real” the being is?

See this video to understand what I’m talking about:

Or if that doesn’t work here’s the website: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qqdluIN2Wjo

My final example is an excerpt from Bicentennial Man, the movie with Robin Williams if you can recall…

Website: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z5YMEwX2-88

Now that all that fun stuff is out of the way, let’s focus on what Haugeland has to say about Cognitive Science. What I have learned thus far from our philosophy class (or at least the one concrete thing that I have learned) is that every word counts in philosophical writings. A close reading of philosophy forces you to question what does that word really mean? What are the intentions of the philosopher based on his use of ___ word? Initially Haugeland states, “The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines —in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense.” He builds on this further by stating, “with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found.” These statements suggest that a) we need to investigate further as to what he means by “intelligent,” b) that human beings are semantic engines, and c) that a computer can “imitate” “any semantic engine” such as humans as long as the right programming has been done. So the examples I placed in this post are considered imitated semantic engines. Can we imply that these imitations are in fact intelligent?

Later on in the article, Haugeland takes the “devils advocate” role on this view of semantic engines. He claims, ” people just aren’t semantic engines…no semantic engine can be genuinely intelligent.” That buzzword intelligent has got my mind reeling. Is artificial intelligence what he infers by the use of the word intelligent? Or is it rather the type of intelligence that comes with Aristotle’s meaning of intelligence or rather his definition of wisdom?

Haugeland cites two strategies for arguing that cognitive science is misconceived. The first being the “Hollow Shell” and the latter being the “Poor Substitute” method. The first strategy suggests that it doesn’t matter how well you program a semantic engine, it can’t really understand anything because it’s lacking this “X” factor. The second, or Poor Substitute, method suggests that such engines are even incapable of acting or “imitating” the notion of understanding. He cites three different possibilities for this “X” factor: consciousness, original intentionality, and caring. The first, consciousness, relates to what was said by a philosopher we already studied. (I can’t remember who it was.) It was something about this internal almost magical quality (help anyone?). It was basically what we would call our “essence.” The argument here is that a semantic engine (which for the remainder of my post I’m going to regard as a human robot for simplicity sake) is incapable of understanding because it lacks a consciousness. What’s interesting is that no one has a specific understanding of consciousness, so it can’t really be stated that human robots are incapable of this quality or rather that they lack it.

The notion of Original Intentionality is just a fancy way of stating that things only have meaning because we give it to them. This brings up the concept that words and symbols and numbers and gestures etc only have meaning based on what we (as humans) have assigned to them. How do we know that human robots don’t have this “X” factor? As Haugeland states, “It seems that original intentionality must depend on whether the object has a suitable structure and/or dispositions, relative to the environment.” That being said, I challenge whether or not such a “suitable structure and/or disposition” can be programmed? Afterall, when we raise children, aren’t we essentially programming them to have just that? I believe that in terms of human beings, original intentionality is programmed by the individuals that raise us or impact us greatly in the way we view our environment and understand the world around us. Haugeland also discusses that a “perfect robot…would seem to act on its own opinions, defend them from attack, and modify them when confronted with counter-evidence–all of which would suggest that they really are the robot’s own opinions.” I find that hard to believe since afterall, a robot’s responses would be programmed. THUS, these reactions/actions would be programmed by a human. This would infer then that these responses of sorts are not the “robot’s own opinions” but rather the creator’s or the author’s opinions.

The third X factor just makes me feel like the combination of these three elements describes wisdom rather than intelligence or cognitive science (but wisdom in the eyes of Aristotle). As Haugeland explains, “the intuition is that a system could not really mean anything unless it had a stake in what it was saying–unless its beliefs and goals mattered to it. Otherwise, it is just mouthing noises, or generating tokens mechanically.”

Reading this article made me think of Bicentennial Man and the human-made robot that I cited earlier in the post. All of those really seem to be human. It’s either the way they look, act, talk, respond (via gestures) that makes them appear human. IF a robot can be programmed to fulfill the three X factors described by Haugeland, does that mean that they are in fact human or rather that they are semantic engines? When watching Bicentennial Man, it’s so easy to accept the notion that a robot could feel, doubt, react (and all those terms used by Descartes). Are we in control of our senses? Or do they control us? I bring this up because I can accept that Robin Williams is a robot in the beginning part of the movie until he has “skin” and thus looks like a human. I can accept that the guy in the second movie clip is a robot until I see him move freely after his presentation.

Reminder: Tonight (Thursday) @ 6pm in Greg 217: I will be giving a short paper entitled “What is the Internet?”

Tomorrow @ 3pm in Greg 213, Bernard Reginster “On being Looked At: Sartre on the Significance of Alienation”

Attend either talk (and say hi to me!) and I will mark you down for extra credit. 

Here are the prompts for this week’s R&L thread. Respond to this post by class on Tuesday for participation credit for the week. 

1) Is the mind a semantic engine? Why or why not?

2) Argue for or against any of Haugeland’s X-factor objections to the central thesis of cognitive science. 

3) Can machines give a damn?

4) Is indistinguishability from human behavior enough for intelligence? Why or why not? Is the imitation game fair?

5) Is the Lady Lovelace objection fatal to the possibility of artificial intelligence?

6) Can machines learn? Are learning machines autonomous?

Combined with Plato, and Socrates (whom was Plato’s teacher), Aristotle is one of the most important founding figures in Western philosophy. “He was the first to create a comprehensive system of Western philosophy, encompassing morality and aesthetics, logic and science, politics and metaphysics.” In his text on “Technē & Epistēmē” he discusses the five states in which the human soul grasps truth in its “affirmations or denials”. The five stages consist of the following: Scientific knowledge, craft-knowledge, intelligence, understanding, and wisdom. The scientific knowledge is knowledge that is “known by necessity”. This intelligence that is known by necessity would resemble the building blocks or basic starting points of much of our scientific knowledge. This particular type of knowledge is teachable and demonstrable like any type of science and mathematics that are learned in a classroom or laboratory through teaching or experimentation. This type of knowledge uses logic, but cannot prove logic. Rather scientific knowledge uses logic to reach other conclusions. Craft-knowledge is a category of knowledge that results in a type of production taking place. A craft is a “state involving true reason concerned with production.” Next there is intelligence. This is a hard virtue of thought as it is not meant in the everyday way we use the term intelligent. A person whom is intelligent would be someone who is able to study what is good for themselves and for human beings. Understanding (the next virtue of thought) is deeply connected with the previous three, as none of the others would be in existence without understanding. It is the necessary base for which all the previous virtues of thought require. Lastly there is wisdom. Wisdom is described by excellence is a craft. Aristotle defines wisdom as “understanding plus scientific knowledge”.

Artificial intelligence is the intelligence of complex machines combined with the branch of computer science which aims to create an artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence can be defined as “the study and design of intelligent agents,” whereby intelligent agent is a system that perceives its environment and takes actions which maximize its chances of success. As we discussed in class, animals as explained by Descartes, are only complex machines with a sort of artificial intelligence as they do not have the thoughts or a mind to think with. This is in effect, saying that artificial intelligence is present in animals. Animals are thrown into Descartes classification of doubt. He doubts they exist as they do not meet this basic requirement of having thoughts. I myself am strongly against such a claim. Animals are more than a type of artificial intelligence. Animals have conscious thoughts, we as humans are simply unable to understand and comprehend them. Humans voice their thoughts through language and behavior as animals do too. Animals “converse” to one another with different sounds and actions that humans cannot decipher. Dolphins are incredibly intelligent, usually even said to be the most intelligent animals second only to humans. “Some research shows that dolphins do have high cognitive capability meaning that they are able to recognize the self”. I believe that Descartes is entirely incorrect in basing existence solely on the fact that in order for a thing to exist it must have a mind with thoughts.

An interesting article about dolphins and other animals and their cognitive abilities can be found at the link: Cetacean Intelligence